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Sadeghi leads several international research and development projects on design and implementation of trustworthy computing platforms and trusted computing, security hardware, particularly Physically Unclonable Functions PUF , Cryptographic Privacy-protecting Systems, and cryptographic compilers in particular for secure computation. He has been serving as a program chair or committee member for a variety of conferences and workshops on information security, trusted computing and applied cryptography.

The award honors excellent scientific achievements that gave visible industrial innovations in Germany. His main research interests are security architectures, cryptographic protocols and security hardware. Department of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology. Vita Prof. Mobile Trusted Computing N.


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Privilege Escalation Attacks on Android. Springer-Verlag, Robust and Undetectable Steganographic Timing Channels for i. Springer Verlag, June Key Attestation from Trusted Execution Environments. Springer Verlag, Baer, et al. Trusted virtual domains - design, implementation and lessons learned. Springer Verlag, December Efficient Privacy-Preserving Face Recognition. The framework is intended to facilitate automatic as well as manual verification of large structured security protocols.

Our approach is to verify properties of component protocols in a multi-protocol environment, then deduce properties about the composed protocol. To reduce the complexity of multi-protocol verification, we introduce a notion of protocol independence and prove a number of theorems that enable analysis of independent component protocols in isolation.

To illustrate the applicability of our framework to real-world protocols, we study a key establishment sequence in WiMAX consisting of three subprotocols.

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Except for a small amount of trivial reasoning, the analysis is done using automatic tools. Authentication is one of the foremost goals of many security protocols. It is most often formalised as a form of agreement, which expresses that the communicating partners agree on the values of a number of variables. In this paper we formalise and study an intensional form of authentication which we call synchronisation. Synchronisation expresses that the messages are transmitted exactly as prescribed by the protocol description.

Synchronisation is a strictly stronger property than agreement for the standard intruder model, because it can be used to detect pre-play attacks. In order to prevent replay attacks on simple protocols, we also define injective synchronisation. Given a synchronising protocol, we show that a sufficient syntactic criterion exists that guarantees that the protocol is injective as well.

We introduce a family of multi-party authentication protocols and discuss six novel protocols, which are members of this family. The first three generalize the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol, the Needham-Schroeder private-key protocol, and the Bilateral Key Exchange protocol. The protocols satisfy injective synchronisation, which is a strong authentication property, and establish agreement over the nonces.

These protocols make use of delegated authentication to keep the protocols small and efficient.

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For each of these protocols we define a strengthened version that does not rely on delegated authentication. All instantiations of the protocol family consist of 2p-1 messages for p parties, which we show to be the minimal number of messages required to achieve the desired security properties in the presence of a Dolev-Yao style intruder with compromised agents.

Formal modeling and verification of security protocols typically assumes that a protocol is executed in isolation, without other protocols sharing the network. We investigate the existence of multi-protocol attacks on protocols described in literature. Given two or more protocols, that share key structures and are executed in the same environment, are new attacks possible?

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Out of 30 protocols from literature, we find that 23 are vulnerable to multi-protocol attacks. We identify two likely attack patterns and sketch a tagging scheme to prevent multi-protocol attacks. The application of formal methods to security protocol analysis has been extensively researched during the last 25 years.

Several formalisms and semi- automatic tools for the verification of security protocols have been developed. However, their applicability is limited to relatively small protocols that run in isolation. Many of the protocols that are in use today cannot be verified using these methods. One of the main reasons for this is that these protocols are composed of several sub-protocols. Such a composition of protocols is not addressed in the majority of formalisms.

In this paper we identify a number of issues that are relevant to applying formal methods to the problem of security protocol composition. Additionally, we describe what research needs to be done to meet this challenge.

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Based on a concise domain analysis we develop a formal semantics of security protocols. Its main virtue is that it is a generic model, in the sense that it is parameterized over e. Further characteristics of the model are a straightforward handling of parallel execution of multiple protocols, locality of security claims, the binding of local constants to role instances, and explicitly defined initial intruder knowledge.

We validate our framework by analysing the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. Injectivity is essential when studying the correctness of authentication protocols, because non-injective protocols may suffer from replay attacks. The standard ways of verifying injectivity either make use of a counting argument, which only seems to be applicable in a verification methodology based on model-checking, or draw conclusions on the basis of the details of the data-model used.

We propose and study a property, the loop property, that can be syntactically verified and is sufficient to guarantee injectivity. Our result is generic in the sense that it holds for a wide range of security protocol models, and does not depend on the details of message contents or nonce freshness. We propose a partial order reduction for model checking security protocols for the secrecy property. Based on this reduction we develop an automatic tool that can check security protocols for secrecy, given a finite execution scenario. We compare this tool to several other tools.


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In this paper we define a general trace model for security protocols which allows to reason about various formal definitions of authentication. In the model, we define a strong form of authentication which we call synchronization.

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We present both an injective and a non-injective version. We relate synchronization to a formulation of agreement in our trace model and contribute to the discussion on intensional vs. State-of-the-art authenticated key exchange AKE protocols are proven secure in game-based security models. These models have considerably evolved in strength from the original Bellare-Rogaway model. However, so far only informal impossibility results, which suggest that no protocol can be secure against stronger adversaries, have been sketched. From our formal impossibility results, we derive strong security models for these protocol classes and give protocols that are secure in them.

In particular, we analyse the security of AKE protocols in the presence of adversaries who can perform attacks based on chosen randomness, in which the adversary controls the randomness used in protocol sessions. Protocols that do not modify memory shared among sessions, which we call stateless protocols, are insecure against chosen-randomness attacks. We propose novel stateful protocols that provide resilience even against this worst case randomness failure, thereby weakening the security assumptions required on the random number generator.

Traditionally, secure one-round key exchange protocols in the PKI setting have either achieved perfect forward secrecy, or forms of deniability, but not both. On the one hand, achieving perfect forward secrecy against active attackers seems to require some form of authentication of the messages, as in signed Diffie-Hellman style protocols, that subsequently sacrifice deniability. On the other hand, using implicit authentication along the lines of MQV and descendants sacrifices perfect forward secrecy in one round and achieves only weak perfect forward secrecy instead.

We show that by reintroducing signatures, it is possible to satisfy both a strong key-exchange security notion as well as a strong form of deniability, in one-round key exchange protocols.